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TINKERING WITH THE PARAMETERS OF STUDENT FREE 
SPEECH RIGHTS FOR ONLINE EXPRESSION: WHEN SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES KNOCK ON THE SCHOOLHOUSE 
GATE 
Allison Martin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Hey!  Teacher!  Leave those kids alone!”1 
Suppose Tommy, a ninth-grade student, and a group of his 
friends are playing video games in Tommy’s living room after school.  
Tommy is upset about being scolded in science class today, and he 
begins making offensive comments about his teacher, Mr. Doe.  He 
mockingly refers to Mr. Doe as “Mr. Hoe,” and makes vulgar jokes 
about “Mr. Hoe” fornicating with animals.  Although Tommy’s 
speech is offensive and not the type of language society would 
condone, it would offend our constitutional expectations to suggest 
that the school has the authority to regulate Tommy’s expression 
while he is sitting in his living room outside of school hours.2  
Although this scenario is straightforward, if Tommy made the same 
disparaging comments on a website, the permissibility of school 
intervention becomes a more convoluted inquiry because the 
traditional free-speech legal paradigm does not neatly fit in the 
online context. 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the scope of students’ 
free-speech rights in the Internet context, but several circuit courts of 
appeals have grappled with the issue.3  The Court has received several 
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       1   PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall (Part II), on THE WALL (Columbia 1980). 
 2  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1097 (U.S. 2012).  (“[W]e do not think the First Amendment can tolerate 
the School District stretching its authority into Justin’s grandmother’s home . . . .”). 
 3  See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct 1095 (2012).  
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petitions for certiorari in online speech cases, but thus far the Justices 
have denied certiorari.4  Because of the lack of guidance, lower courts 
have experienced difficulty applying the traditional student-speech 
jurisprudence to the online context where the expression occurs 
outside of school.5 
Currently, four Supreme Court decisions govern the application 
of the First Amendment to the educational environment: Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District,6 Bethel School District v. 
Fraser,7 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,8 and Morse v. Frederick.9  
Notably, all four cases were factually rooted in speech that occurred 
during school hours and/or on school property.10  Online speech, 
which occurs in the “borderless medium” of the Internet, does not fit 
neatly into the on-campus/off-campus speech dichotomy of First 
Amendment precedent.11  Because the inherent characteristics of the 
Internet render a determination of the precise location of online 
expression nearly impossible, this Comment argues that cyberspace is 
best viewed as a unique jurisdictional “location” for purposes of First 
Amendment analysis, and therefore online speech should not be 
subject to the traditional “on school grounds” legal framework.  If the 
Supreme Court elects to hear one of the online student-speech cases 
in the future, the Court will have the opportunity to introduce some 
much-needed clarity to this area of jurisprudence by holding that 
schools may only regulate speech related to educators in cases where 
the speech causes a substantial disruption of school affairs. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
addressed the scope of students’ First Amendment protection in the 
Internet age in Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. v. Blue 
Mountain School District.12  Factually, Layshock and Blue Mountain are 
 
 4  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3. 
 5  Carolyn Joyce Mattus, Legal Update: Is it Really My Space? Public Schools and 
Student Speech on the Internet After Layshock v. Hermitage and Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
School District, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 318, 332 (2010). 
 6  393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 7  478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 8  484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 9  551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 10  Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551 
U.S. 393. 
 11  James M. Patrick, Comment, The Civility-Police: The Rising Need to Balance 
Students’ Rights to Off-Campus Internet Speech Against the School’s Compelling Interests, 79 
U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 886 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011); J.S. v. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).  
MARTIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  8:18 AM 
2013] COMMENT 775 
substantially similar.13  In both cases, a student created a false 
MySpace profile for a school principal, wrote unflattering and 
offensive descriptions of the principal on the profile, and was 
subsequently suspended for the conduct.14  Despite the factual 
similarities, two Third Circuit panels, comprised of different judges, 
reached divergent legal conclusions, creating some intra-circuit 
friction.15  The Third Circuit subsequently vacated both judgments 
and reheard the cases en banc.16  The en banc decisions, issued on 
the same day, held that the two schools violated the students’ First 
Amendment rights by imposing punishment for the online 
expression because the school districts could not show that the 
speech created a foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption in the 
school.17 
Layshock and Blue Mountain provide interesting examples of the 
complex constitutional issues that can arise out of a childish prank 
expressing frustrations towards a teacher.  In the online context, 
lower courts have struggled to harmonize the idea that students do 
not lose their First Amendment freedoms at the schoolhouse gate18 
with the Supreme Court’s recognition that students’ constitutional 
rights are not always analogous to the rights of adults.19  The scope of 
school officials’ authority to regulate students’ Internet-based speech 
is an issue that is ripe for Supreme Court resolution.20  Given the 
prevalence of Internet usage by today’s schoolchildren,21 guidance 
from the Supreme Court on the parameters of student speech is 
 
 13  See Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915. 
 14  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 20711; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 920. 
 15  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, No. 07-
4465, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11994 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011); J.S. v. Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, No. 08-4138, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
11947 (3d. Cir. June 13, 2011); see Joseph Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse 
Gate: Offensive, Online Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. 
REV. 97, 100 (2010); Katie Maloney, Conflicting Online Speech Rulings Vacated, Will be 
Heard by Full Third Circuit, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Apr. 13, 2010), 
https://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=2066. 
 16  Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915. 
 17  Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915. 
 18  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 19  Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 20  Tomain, supra note 15, at 102.  
 21  A 2010 report concluded that ninety-three percent of the school-aged 
population between the ages of twelve and seventeen use the Internet.  Furthermore, 
seventy-three percent of “wired” teens use social networking websites.  AMANDA 
LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA AND YOUNG ADULTS (2010), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young 
-Adults/Summary-of-Findings.aspx.  
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desperately needed.  Free speech in schools “impact[s] millions of 
students and thousands of school administrators.”22  Both students 
and administrators would benefit from the establishment of a 
standard governing online speech.23  Presently, school officials are left 
guessing at when they do and do not have the authority to punish 
student speech,24 and defending subsequent litigation is a waste of 
school resources and taxpayer dollars.  From the students’ 
perspective, the lack of clarity can result in a chilling effect where 
students are nervous to voice opinions on important issues due to 
fear of being censured for “inappropriate” language.25 
Part II of this Comment details the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence governing the First Amendment’s application to 
student speech.  Part III of this Comment provides an overview of the 
Third Circuit cases illustrating the issues that arise when schools are 
confronted with a student’s off-campus Internet speech.  Part IV 
emphasizes the need for Supreme Court clarification of the 
applicable standard that courts should apply when confronted with 
offensive online student speech.  Part IV continues with the argument 
that (1) cyberspace should be analyzed as a unique and independent 
location for First Amendment analysis, and (2) the Tinker standard 
requiring a showing of a substantial disruption within the school 
should be the governing inquiry in all student online speech cases 
where the subject of the speech is a school employee.  Further, Part 
IV argues that the First Amendment should not preclude schools 
from imposing punishment in situations where the online speech is 
targeting a fellow student or where the speech poses a threat of 
violence within the school.  Part V concludes, reiterating the 
ambiguity in the current law and proposing a solution to the 
troublesome problem. 
 
 22  David Hudson, High Court Asked to Hear Student Online Speech Case, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CTR. (July 29, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/high-court 
-asked-to-hear-student-online-speech-case (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 23  See Maloney, supra note 15. 
 24  See Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still 
Standing, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (2009) (arguing that when principals are faced 
with a decision between respecting a student’s free speech rights and addressing a 
possible threat, it is a “no brainer” from the principal’s perspective to restrict the 
speech). 
 25  Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 407 (2011); Wendy Davis, No More Pencils, No More Facebook, THE 
NATIONAL PULSE (July 1, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine 
/article/no_more_pencils_no_more_facebooks. 
MARTIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  8:18 AM 
2013] COMMENT 777 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE WITHIN THE “SCHOOLHOUSE 
GATES” 
Four Supreme Court decisions establish the legal underpinnings 
of students’ free-speech rights, all of which specifically address speech 
that occurred on the school property and/or during school hours.26  
The first case, Tinker v. Des Moines, is the seminal case governing First 
Amendment analysis in the public school context.27  Tinker is 
generally recognized as the “high water mark” for students’ freedom 
of expression; it is the most protective of students’ rights28 as it 
requires a showing that the speech posed a foreseeable risk of a 
substantial disruption within the school.29  After that decision, the 
Supreme Court carved out three exceptions to the free-speech 
paradigm.30  These exceptions, while limiting Tinker’s bite, did not 
overturn Tinker, which remains the starting point for all speech 
analysis inside the schoolhouse gate.31  In the online context, lower 
courts have relied on these four cases as the crux of their First 
Amendment analysis, even though the original holdings were limited 
to traditional speech that was definitively on-campus.32 
A.  Tinker v. Des Moines 
In Tinker, three students were suspended from school after they 
refused to remove the black armbands they wore as an expression of 
opposition to the military conflict in Vietnam.33  The legal analysis 
began with the since oft-quoted maxim that, despite the unique 
characteristics of the education environment, neither students nor 
teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”34  The Court emphasized the 
limitations on the authority of school officials to censor student 
opinions, especially in cases where the prohibition is based on a 
desire to suppress a particular viewpoint.35  Tinker established the 
 
 26  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Bethel 
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 27  See 393 U.S. 503; Tomain, supra note 15, at 109. 
 28  Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Youth and Social Media: Student Speech Online: Too 
Young to Exercise the Right of Free Speech?, 7 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 101, 110 (2011). 
 29  Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
 30  See Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551 U.S. 393. 
 31  See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 34  Id. at 506. 
 35  Id. at 511.  The court emphasized that the prohibition was clearly content-
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standard that the First Amendment protects student speech unless 
school authorities reasonably believe the speech will cause a 
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities.”36  Therefore, unless the student “materially disrupts 
classwork, or . . . [creates] substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others,”37 the school cannot impose restrictions on students’ 
freedom of expression.38  Although Tinker involved a political 
message, the majority did not base its decision on the fact the 
expression was “high-value” speech.39 
In defining what constitutes a substantial disruption, the Court 
opined that “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint” is an insufficient 
justification for infringing upon a student’s First Amendment rights.40  
The politically charged context in which Tinker was decided is 
extremely important for lower courts to keep in mind when applying 
the standard, given the divisive nature of the Vietnam War and the 
realistic potential for violent conflict over the war.41 
Tinker’s facts offer some guidance in discerning the parameters 
of the substantial disruption standard.  The record in Tinker notes 
that the armbands caused some discussion outside of the 
classrooms,42 that a dispute over the armbands interrupted a math 
lesson, and that some students made disparaging comments towards 
one of the armband-wearers.43  The majority concluded that these 
incidents did not reach the level of a substantial disruption,44 and 
thus set the standard for circumstances under which the school may 
punish student speech within the bounds of the Constitution.45 
B.  Bethel School District v. Fraser 
The Supreme Court next addressed the parameters of free 
speech within public schools in Bethel, upholding the school district’s 
 
based, and thus was subject to a higher standard of scrutiny.  Id. 
 36  Id. at 514. 
 37  Id. at 51314. 
 38  Id. at 513. 
 39  See generally id. 
 40  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 41  TOM WELLS, THE WAR WITHIN: AMERICA’S BATTLE OVER VIETNAM 297 (2005) 
(“America’s high schools were the scenes of twenty-seven bombings and attempted 
bombings.”). 
 42  393 U.S. at 514. 
 43  Id. at 51819 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 44  Id. at 514. 
 45  See, e.g., Bethel Sch. District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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authority to suspend a high-school student after the student gave a 
sexually explicit speech during a school assembly.46  The student used 
extended and elaborate sexual metaphors to reference a friend who 
was running for student government.47  During the speech, students 
hooted and acted out the sexual gestures referenced in the speech.48  
In upholding the school’s authority to suspend the student, the Court 
held that the First Amendment is not a barrier when school officials 
determine that allowing the vulgar and lewd speech during a school 
event would undermine the school’s educational mission, and 
therefore the school seeks to disassociate itself from the vulgar 
content of the speech.49 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized the 
narrow application of Fraser.50  The Justice opined that the holding 
was limited “to restrict a high school student’s use of disruptive 
language in a speech given to a high school assembly”; the opinion 
did not give school officials limitless authority to regulate speech.51  
Legal scholars have read Fraser to require (1) some element of a 
captive audience, (2) speech with lewd or offensive sexual content, 
and (3) the school’s needs to disassociate itself from the content of 
the speech.52  Because Fraser involved offensive and vulgar student 
speech, the applicability of the Fraser holding to student speech over 
the Internet has attracted attention from lower courts and legal 
scholars.53 
C.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
In Kuhlmeier, the Court addressed the issue of the extent of 
editorial control that a school can permissibly exercise over the 
contents of a student-produced newspaper.54  The students alleged 
that the school infringed upon their First Amendment rights when a 
teacher removed two articles from the final edition of the 
 
 46  478 U.S. 675.  It is also important to note that students were required to either 
attend the assembly or report to study hall.  Id. at 677. 
 47  Id. at 677–78.  “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in 
his shirt, his character is firm—but most of all, his belief in you, the students of 
Bethel, is firm. . . . Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. . . .”.  
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 48  Id. at 677. 
 49  Id. at 685. 
 50  Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 51  Id.  
 52  Tomain, supra note 15, at 104.  
 53  See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 54  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). 
MARTIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  8:18 AM 
780 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:773 
newspaperone describing pregnancy at the school and the other 
discussing the impact of divorce.55  The Court concluded that, 
because the paper was intended to be a “supervised learning 
experience for journalism students,” the school was within its 
authority to reasonably regulate content as long as the editorial 
control was related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.56  In 
reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that the Tinker 
standard did not apply to circumstances where the school essentially 
endorses the speech through publication in the school paper and the 
school seeks to disassociate itself from the content.57  Given the facts 
of Kuhlmeier, this case is of little applicable value in situations 
involving offensive online student speech where the speech is clearly 
not sanctioned by the school. 
D.  Morse v. Frederick 
Morse58 is the most recently defined exception to Tinker.  In 
Morse, a group of students unfurled a banner that read “BONG HiTS 
4 JESUS” during a school-sponsored field trip that occurred during 
school hours.59  After one student refused to take down the banner, 
he was suspended for violating school policy by encouraging the use 
of drugs.60  In a 54 decision, the Court held that a school may 
“restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”61  Justice Alito and 
Justice Kennedy contributed the final two votes necessary to reach a 
plurality decision,62 and therefore “the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”63  In joining with the judgment 
in Morse, Justice Alito repeatedly emphasized that the holding is 
narrowly limited to the regulation of drug-related speech, which 
“stand[s] at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”64 
 
 
 55  Id.  
 56  Id. at 27073. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 59  Id. at 39798. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. at 403. 
 62  Id.  
 63  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 64  Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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III.  THE APPLICATION OF TINKER AND ITS PROGENY TO THE ONLINE 
SPEECH CONTEXT 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School 
District illustrate the difficulties that lower courts have experienced 
when discerning the permissible scope of school regulation of off-
campus, online speech under traditional First Amendment legal 
precedents.  The Second Circuit, in Doninger v. Niehoff, reached a 
conflicting conclusion and, perhaps more importantly, demonstrated 
the need for clarification of what constitutes a substantial disruption 
under the Tinker standard.65 
A.  Layshock v. Hermitage School District 
Justin Layshock was a seventeen-year-old high school senior 
when he used his grandmother’s computer after school to create a 
fictitious MySpace profile66 of his principal, Eric Trosch.67  Justin filled 
out the personal information section of the profile by falsely 
answering a series of survey questions, with all of the responses 
reflecting a theme of “big,” which Justin intended to be a reference to 
Mr. Trosch’s size.68 
1.  Birthday: too drunk to remember 
2.  Are you a health freak: big steroid freak 
3.  In the past month have you smoked: big blunt 
4.  In the past month have you been on pills: big pills 
5.  In the past month have you gone skinny dipping: big 
lake, not big dick . . . .69 
Under the “[i]nterests” section of the profile, Justin wrote 
“Transgender Appreciators of Alcoholic Beverages” and listed 
“Steroids International” as a group in which Mr. Trosch was a 
member.70  Justin proceeded to add other students as “friends” of the 
fake profile, and as a result, knowledge of the profile’s existence 
quickly spread throughout the school.71  Justin accessed the profile 
from school on two occasionsonce to show friends in Spanish class, 
 
 65  See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 66  MySpace is a popular social networking website, which allows users to share 
personal information with other users and add other users as “friends.”  Doe v. 
MySpace Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
 67  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 20708 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 68  Id.   
 69  Id.  
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. 
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and once purportedly to delete it before a teacher stopped him.72 
Mr. Trosch learned about the profile through his daughter, a 
junior at the school.73  School officials met with Justin and his mother, 
and Justin admitted to creating the profile.74  After the meeting, 
Justin took it upon himself to apologize to Mr. Trosch, both in 
person and with a written letter of apology.75  The School District 
nevertheless sent Justin a letter informing him that the punishment 
for his conduct was to be determined at an informal hearing.76  At the 
hearing, the School District imposed the following punishment: (1) a 
ten-day suspension; (2) placement in an alternative education setting 
within the school for the remainder of the year; (3) a ban from all 
extracurricular activities; and (4) a ban from participation in his 
graduation ceremony.77 
The Layshock family brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.78  In 
the district court, both parties moved for summary judgment, and the 
court entered judgment in favor of Justin on the grounds that the 
punishment violated his First Amendment rights.79  A Third Circuit 
panel affirmed this decision on the grounds that permitting the 
school to punish Justin for his out-of-school conduct could create a 
dangerous precedent.80  The Third Circuit subsequently ordered a 
rehearing en banc.81 
In the en banc opinion, the court commenced its legal analysis 
with a brief overview of the Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse 
standards.82  Applying the facts of the case to the First Amendment 
analytical framework, the court concluded that “[w]e do not think 
the First Amendment can tolerate the School District stretching its 
authority into Justin’s grandmother’s home and reaching Justin while 
he is sitting at her computer after school in order to punish him for 
expressive conduct he engaged in there.”83  The court placed heavy 
 
 72  Id. at 209.  
 73  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208. 
 74  Id. at 209.  Justin’s parents also disciplined him for his conduct.  Id.   
 75  Id.  
 76  Id.  
 77  Id. at 210. 
 78  Id.  (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).  Section 1983 creates a cause of action 
against state actors for the deprivation of an individual’s constitutional and 
statutorily-granted civil rights.  Id. 
 79  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 211. 
 80  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated for 
reh’g en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 81  Id. 
 82 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 21114. 
 83  Id. at 216. 
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emphasis on the school district’s failure to establish that Justin’s 
speech caused a substantial disturbance or a foreseeable expectation 
of a disturbance, and therefore held that Justin’s speech could not be 
punished under Tinker.84  The court opined that it would be bad 
policy to establish that a school has limitless authority to control 
student conduct at home to the same extent the school can control 
the student’s conduct within school.85 
The school district argued that the speech was punishable under 
Fraser because the language in the MySpace profile was vulgar, lewd, 
and offensive, and was aimed at the school community.86  The court 
rejected this argument because Fraser does not apply to “conduct 
which occurred outside of the school context” and Justin’s expression 
fell outside of the schoolhouse gate.87 
In determining the scope of student free-speech rights, the 
Layshock court correctly applied Tinker as the governing standard, and 
appropriately declined to stretch Fraser to apply to all offensive 
student speech. 
B.  J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District 
J.S., an eighth-grade honor-roll student, created a MySpace 
profile of the Blue Mountain Middle School principal, James 
McGonigle, with a friend in J.S.’s home after school.88  The profile 
featured Mr. McGonigle’s official school photograph, but falsely 
identified the user as a “bisexual Alabama middle school principal 
named ‘M-Hoe.’”89  J.S. depicted Mr. McGonigle’s interests as 
“detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain, spending time with 
my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking 
in my office, [and] hitting on students and their parents.”90  In the 
“About me” section of the profile, J.S. posted the following 
unflattering description of McGonigle: 
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes.  It’s your oh so wonderful, 
fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I 
have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other 
principal’s [sic] to be just like me.  I know, I know, you’re 
all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to myspace is 
 
 84  Id.  
 85  Id.  
 86  Id. at 21617. 
 87  Id. at 219. 
 88  J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 89  Id.  
 90  Id.  “Fraintrain” was a reference to McGonigle’s wife, who was also a school 
employee.  Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
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because—I am keeping an eye on my students (who[m] I 
care for so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, 
and aren’t in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind), 
dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and 
last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man (who 
satisfies my needs) MY FRAINTRAIN.91 
Initially, J.S. made the profile publically accessible to anyone, but 
later changed the settings to private so only individuals added as a 
“friend” could view the content.92  Because the school’s computers 
blocked MySpace, students could not access the profile from the 
school.93  But the profile did make its way on to school grounds when 
McGonigle requested that a student bring him a printout of the site.94  
McGonigle held a conference with J.S., her friend, and both sets of 
parents, and the parties were informed that the students would 
receive a ten-day suspension.95 
J.S.’s family sued the Blue Mountain School District under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.96  The district court granted Blue Mountain’s motion 
for summary judgment.97  The district court held that even though 
the Tinker standard did not govern because the school failed to prove 
that a substantial disruption occurred or was likely to occur, the 
school had authority to punish J.S. under Morse and Fraser because 
the speech in question was “vulgar, lewd and potentially illegal 
speech [and] had an effect on campus.”98  J.S. appealed, and a Third 
Circuit panel affirmed and held that, under Tinker, “off-campus 
speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a substantial 
disruption or material interference with a school need not satisfy any 
geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to 
Tinker.”99  Finding that there was a threat of a substantial disruption to 
the school, the Third Circuit panel concluded that the School 
District’s suspension did not infringe J.S.’s First Amendment rights.100  
This decision was subsequently vacated for rehearing by the Third 
 
 91  Id. at 921. 
 92  Id.  
 93  Id. at 921.  
 94  Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 921. 
 95  Id. at 922.  The School District Superintendent later approved this suspension.  
Id. 
 96  Id. at 920. 
 97  Id. at 923. 
 98  Id. at 923 (internal citations omitted). 
 99  J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist, 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated for 
reh’g, No. 08-4138, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11947 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011). 
 100  Id. at 303. 
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Circuit en banc.101 
In its en banc opinion affirming the panel’s judgment, the Third 
Circuit began the legal analysis by “assum[ing], without deciding, 
that Tinker applies to J.S.’s speech in this case.”102  The court clarified 
the Tinker requirement that the speech must pose a foreseeable risk 
of a substantial disruption, but it does not need to be absolutely 
certain that disruption will occur.103  The Blue Mountain School District 
court concluded that the general rumblings about the profile, slight 
class disturbance, and rearranging of a counselor’s schedule did not 
amount to a substantial disruption under Tinker, and there was no 
valid reason for school officials to foresee a substantial disruption.104 
The court rejected the school district’s argument that the speech 
was punishable under Fraser, holding that the Fraser “lewdness” 
standard only applies to on-campus speech and does not reach 
online, out-of-school expression105  The Third Circuit placed heavy 
emphasis on the fact that the content of the profile was so ridiculous 
that there was no way a reasonable person could have taken it as 
fact.106 
The Blue Mountain School District dissent argued that, under 
Tinker, a substantial disruption did occur within the school, and 
furthermore, the decision “severely undermines” a school’s ability to 
impose discipline on students that disrupt the school environment.107  
The dissent focused on the “malicious . . . vulgar and obscene” 
content of the profile as sufficient to render a showing of potential for 
a substantial disruption within the school.108 
Similar to the holding in Layshock, the Blue Mountain School 
District court reached the proper result in denying the school district 
the authority to punish J.S. for her off-campus online speech. 
C.  Doninger v.  Niehoff 
The Second Circuit addressed a similar issue, but diverged from 
the Third Circuit in its approach to addressing the parameters of 
 
 101  J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d 
Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). 
 102  Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 926. 
 103  Id. at 928 
 104  Id. at 925, 929. 
 105  Id. at 933. 
 106  Id. at 930 
 107  Id. at 941, 945 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 108  Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
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students’ First Amendment rights.109  In Doninger v. Niehoff, a student, 
Avery Doninger, was prohibited from accepting a student-
government position after she sent a mass e-mail and posted 
comments on her blog expressing her feelings about the school 
administration’s cancellation of an annual school music festival.110  In 
her post, the student wrote that “jamfest [was] cancelled due to [the] 
douchebags in [the] central office,” and urged other students to e-
mail school administrators about the cancelled event to “piss [the 
principal] off more.”111  Doninger’s efforts resulted in an influx of 
calls and e-mails to the school.112  The school discovered the blog post 
two weeks after the resolution of the situation, and at that point the 
principal informed Doninger that she was no longer eligible to run 
for student government because of her inflammatory comments.113  
Despite not appearing on the ballot, Doninger won the election as a 
write-in candidate, but the school would not permit her to accept the 
position.114 
The Second Circuit found that the deluge of e-mails, phone 
calls, angry students, and several disrupted schedules amounted to a 
substantial disturbance under Tinker; therefore, the school was within 
its authority to punish Doninger for her conduct.115  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court explained that it was important in this case that 
the punishment imposed—restricting Doninger’s participation in 
student government—was reasonable given that the “disruption” was 
related to a governmental function.116 
Although the Second Circuit properly concluded that Tinker was 
the controlling standard in Doninger, the court’s conclusion that the 
e-mails, phone calls, and upset students were sufficient to amount to 
a potential disruption117 illustrates the need for clarification of what 
constitutes a substantial disruption, with particular emphasis on the 
context in which Tinker was originally decided. 
 
 
 109  Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. at 34041 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 112  Id. at 341. 
 113  Id. at 342. 
 114  Id. at 343. 
 115  Doninger, 642 F.3d at 34849. 
 116  Id. at 350. 
 117  Id. 
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IV.  CLARIFICATION OF THE TINKER STANDARD FOR INTERNET SPEECH 
The unique nature of the school environment inherently 
requires some deviation from traditional First Amendment 
constraints in order for the school to operate effectively.118  Obviously 
the same freedom to speak openly on a public sidewalk cannot be 
granted to students in the classroom since such freedom would 
seriously hinder the educational process.119  Courts generally review 
cases involving the discretionary functions of school officials 
deferentially because of the unique decision-making processes and 
expertise that educational issues entail.120  But courts note that this 
does not grant unlimited authority for schools officials to trammel 
the rights of students,121 and the unique characteristics of the school 
setting do not permit school officials to “possess absolute authority 
over their students.”122  This creates a need for schools to balance 
students’ rights with school efficiency. 
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District are important because 
they demonstrate the irreconcilability of the current free speech 
paradigm established in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse with the advent of 
new media.  As the Third Circuit correctly recognized, the Tinker 
substantial disruption standard is the only precedent that is neatly 
applicable in the Internet context and does not completely deprive 
students of free speech rights in all settings.123  Because the outcome 
of student speech cases is so fact-sensitive,124 any standard controlling 
online expression must be sufficiently broad to accommodate a 
variety of situations in order to have long-term applicability.  The 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a student, online speech 
case to reform the First Amendment standard for online expression 
by (1) establishing cyberspace as a unique “location” for student 
speech analysis, and (2) situating Tinker as the governing standard for 
all situations that implicate student free speech over the Internet. 
There are several important reasons for the Supreme Court to 
 
 118  Goldman, supra note 25, at 406.  The author noted several less obvious 
examples of ways schools interfere with free speech: teachers are restricted in their 
freedom to discuss particular topics outside of the curriculum, grades are assigned 
based on the quality of a student’s writing and speech, and writing prompts limit 
students’ freedom to choose a topic.  Id. 
 119  Id.  
 120  J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 92526 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 121  Id. at 926. 
 122  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 506, 511 (1969). 
 123  See generally Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915; Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. 
Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 124  Mattus, supra note 5, at 332. 
MARTIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  8:18 AM 
788 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:773 
articulate a standard governing this issue.  Under current free speech 
analysis, it can be difficult to advise educators as to when speech can 
be punished and when the First Amendment precludes a restraint on 
student speech.125  The lack of a definition for the scope of online 
free speech rights can have equally significant implications for a 
teacher’s or an administrator’s right to voice his or her opinion 
online, as well as on students’ rights, although the consequences of 
the ambiguity on educators is beyond the scope of this Comment.126  
“Just as the First Amendment tolerates some false speech to ensure 
true speech is not lost, the First Amendment tolerates online student 
speech that schools may find reasonably offensive to ensure valuable 
speech is not lost.”127  Freedom of expression fosters creative thinking 
in young adults, as they develop their voice and learn the value of 
civil discourse on controversial topics.128  Schools certainly have an 
interest in discouraging students from engaging in offensive speech 
in relation to the school, but this interest is insufficient to justify 
giving schools the unbridled authority to control speech that occurs 
within a student’s home using the Internet.  The current ambiguity in 
the law could result in a chilling effect, with students hesitant to voice 
opinions on important social or political issues related to school for 
fear of punishment because of the language they use.129 
A.  Cyberspace as a Unique Location for Online Speech Purposes 
The Supreme Court should eliminate the on-campus/off-
campus dichotomy for online speech and simply treat cyberspace as 
an independent location for the purposes of free speech analysis.  
The creation of cyberspace as an independent location would allow 
traditional free speech precedent to peacefully co-exist with a new 
framework for online speech.  This framework would promote 
simplicity and predictability in legal analysis by eliminating the need 
 
 125  See The Third Circuit Lays Out Rules for Responding to Off-Campus Expression, 
DISCHELL, BARTLE, YANOFF, DOOLEY, http://dischellbartle.com/dbyd_difference_feb 
_10_part_i_ed_law/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 126  See Jeanette Rundquist & Peggy McGlone, Teachers on Facebook: Hot-button Issue 
Examined Across N.J. in Wake of Teacher’s Anti-gay Posts, N.J. STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 18, 2011, 
available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/10/nj_school_districts_grapple 
_wi.html (discussing a teacher’s Facebook comments on the morality of 
homosexuality and the subsequent public reaction).  As some parents are calling for 
the teacher’s dismissal due to the comments, some guidance by the Court on the 
parameters of the First Amendment over the Internet would be beneficial to give 
teachers notice of the extent of their rights as well.  Id. 
 127  Tomain, supra note 15, at 105. 
 128  Macleod-Ball, supra note 28, at 131. 
 129  Goldman, supra note 25, at 407. 
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to weigh factors such as where the speech was originally created, 
where it was later accessed, and how and when it ever permeated 
school grounds. 
Lower courts have noticed the difficulty in applying traditional 
location-based analysis to online speech.130  “If courts and legal 
scholars cannot discern the contours of First Amendment protections 
for student Internet speech . . . then it is certainly unreasonable to 
expect school administrators . . . to predict where the line between 
on- and off-campus speech will be drawn in this new digital era.”131 
The prevalence of cell phones in schools has further 
complicated the analysis because many students own cell phones with 
Internet capabilities that enable them to access social networking 
sites from school property without using any school resources to do 
so.132  As a borderless medium of communication, there is no obvious 
way to establish a location for Internet speech.  Scholars have 
proposed a variety of ideas, which include designating the location of 
speech to be the location where the online expression was originally 
posted,133 the location where the speech is ultimately disseminated to 
others,134 or the location where the student intended the speech to 
reach,135 among others.  Although there are certainly merits to each 
of these proposals, establishing cyberspace as a distinct location 
would eliminate the fact-intensive threshold inquiry of determining a 
“location” of the speechan ultimately arbitrary determination given 
the unique nature of cyberspace.136 
By definitively articulating a standard in which online speech is 
neither on-campus nor off-campus, courts will not have to make 
artificial determinations regarding where online speech occurred 
and can devote all judicial resources to evaluating the merits of the 
case.  Establishing cyberspace as a unique place will permit the Court 
to fashion new rules exclusively for the Internet137such as the 
 
 130  See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., 
concurring) (“[H]ow can one tell whether speech takes place on or off campus? 
Answering this question will not always be easy.”). 
 131  Davis, supra note 25.  
 132  Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 951 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  
 133  Goldman, supra note 25, at 424.  
 134  Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How to Analyze Student Speech in the 
Age of the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 114849 (2008). 
 135  See Patrick, supra note 11, at 888; cf. Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on 
Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 178 (2003). 
 136  Tomain, supra note 15, at 130.  
 137  David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and BordersThe Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (1996) (arguing for the establishment of cyberspace as a 
distinct location for purposes of trademark analysis, defamation law, fraud and 
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application of the Tinker standard as advanced in this Comment—
without disrupting current First Amendment jurisprudence 
governing traditional speech.  This will also prevent student speech 
from being “converted” into on-campus speech inadvertently for 
reasons outside of the speaker’s control, as is possible in cases where 
another student accesses the content from a school computer 
unbeknownst to the original speaker.138  Speech over the Internet is 
inherently different from a statement made in the classroom, and the 
Court should recognize it as such by leaving it unregulated by 
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. 
A potential counterargument is that schools should at least have 
the authority to punish students in instances where the student wrote 
the offensive content during school hours or used a school 
computer.139  But there is an inherent line-drawing problem in this 
argument.  For example, it is not apparent how this rule would apply 
to situations where an innocent website is made during school hours, 
but offensive material is added later at home on the student’s 
personal computer.  A bright-line rule that treats the Internet as a 
unique jurisdictional location for speech purposes works to eliminate 
ambiguity in the legal analysis.  This is not to suggest that schools are 
powerless to regulate students’ Internet use during school hours.  On 
the contrary, schools can and do use blocking software to restrict 
access to certain websites on school computers,140 and faculty should 
be encouraged to monitor computer use to ensure that students are 
engaging in legitimate educational activities.  Teachers are well 
within their authority to prevent students from misusing educational 
resources and squandering class time and therefore are permitted to 
exercise authority to prevent prohibited conduct at the time when 
the student is engaging in it. 
B.  Tinker, not Fraser, Should Govern the Scope of a School’s Authority 
The unique characteristics of the school environment may 
warrant some limitations on students’ First Amendment rights,141 but 
 
antitrust, and copyright law on the grounds that traditional legal frameworks are 
inapplicable to these areas over the Internet.  The authors posit that establishing 
cyberspace as a distinct jurisdictional location will permit the formation of rules that 
are specifically tailored to the unique characteristics of the Internet). 
 138  See Patrick, supra note 11, at 866 (arguing “this threshold can easily be 
manipulated by administrators or a student’s enemies to bring the speech into the 
realm of on-campus speech”). 
 139  See generally id. at 883. 
 140  Tomain, supra note 15, at 176. 
 141  Goldman, supra note 25, at 406. 
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the Court has repeatedly emphasized that this does not equate to 
limitless authority over student expression.142  Justice Brennan 
articulated in his dissent in Kuhlmeier that “[e]ven in its capacity as 
educator the State may not assume an Orwellian guardianship of the 
public mind[.]”143  As one legal scholar noted, “[i]f students do not 
have free speech rights, Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ metaphor is 
meaningless because a student cannot shed rights that do not 
exist.”144  Granting schools the authority to punish students for speech 
that occurs off-campus and does not pose a foreseeable risk of a 
substantial disruption would “vest school officials with dangerously 
overbroad censorship discretion.”145  The Third Circuit properly 
applied First Amendment jurisprudence in Layshock and Blue 
Mountain School District by superimposing Tinker as the controlling 
legal analysis and declining to extend Fraser to the offensive online 
speech. 
“Although Tinker may not be looking fabulous at forty” given the 
Supreme Court holdings in its wake, it is still viewed as the seminal 
student-speech case.146  The Tinker standard not only permits schools 
to run efficiently without disturbances, but also protects students’ 
freedom of expression in all cases where the educational purpose of 
the school is not impeded.  In the online context under Tinker, a 
school can exercise its disciplinary authority in a constitutionally 
permissible manner where there are “any facts which might 
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities[.]”147 
Some scholars have suggested that the substantial disruption test 
is overbroad in its coverage when the standard is applied to online 
speech.148  To address concerns of abuse of the substantial disruption 
standard, the Court must clarify what is a “substantial disruption” to 
ensure predictability in its application.  Doninger v. Neihoff illustrates 
the problem of applying the substantial disruption test to scenarios 
that clearly do not rise to the Supreme Court’s articulated standards 
in Tinker.149  In Doninger, the court found that phone calls, e-mails, 
and angry students were sufficient to amount to a substantial 
 
 142  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
 143  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 286 (1988) (Brennan, J. 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 144  Tomain, supra note 15, at 109.  
 145  J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 146  Calvert, supra note 24, at 1190. 
 147  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 148  Goldman, supra note 25, at 408. 
 149  Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
MARTIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  8:18 AM 
792 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:773 
disruption of school affairs.150  When these arguably commonplace 
occurrences are compared with the threat of violence posed by the 
expression in Tinker, the tremendous disparity in the levels of severity 
clearly demonstrates the need for reiteration of what constitutes a 
substantial disruption. 
A substantial disruption requires more than “some remote 
apprehension of disturbance”; rather, there must be a legitimate 
threat of it occurring.151  While, in some cases, angry students, phone 
calls, and e-mails to the school administration may appear to present 
the potential for a substantial disruption, these actions do not pose 
any threat to the school, as they are merely peaceful ways to express 
dissatisfaction with a particular school position.  A desire to avoid 
discomfort by suppressing an unpopular viewpoint does not 
constitute a “substantial disruption.”152  This warrants the conclusion 
that, although the school may not want students to post negative 
comments about educators online, the mere fact that the comments 
portray the school in an unsavory light is not a valid reason to 
suppress the expression.  While comments about a teacher or a 
school administrator on a social networking site may create a strained 
relationship between the adult and the student,153 the Court should 
clearly establish that such situations, standing alone, do not amount 
to a foreseeable substantial disturbance, contrary to the point 
advanced by the dissent in Blue Mountain.154  The Supreme Court 
should articulate that lower courts need to keep in mind the 
politically turbulent atmosphere that existed at the time Tinker was 
decided,155 and judges should weigh the consequences of the speech 
in the case before them against the threat posed by the anti-war 
speech in Tinker. 
The other three Supreme Court cases, while important in the 
traditional school speech setting, are ill-suited for application to 
online speech cases like Layshock and Blue Mountain School District.  Of 
the three cases, Fraser appears to be the most relevant,156 but it would 
 
 150  Id. at 351. 
 151  Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 152  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 153  Goldman, supra note 25, at 408. 
 154  See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 945 (3d Cir. 2011) (Fisher, 
J., dissenting). 
 155  Despite the highly polarizing and emotional background of the Vietnam War, 
the Tinker Court did not find that the recognizably anti-war bands presented a 
foreseeable risk of disruption.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 156  Although it is also possible that an online student speech case could implicate 
Morse, this issue has not been raised in the courts yet and therefore does not merit 
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also be the most constitutionally problematic if applied to online 
speech, amounting to a vast expansion of the Fraser Court’s 
holding.157  To extend Fraser to all cases where students use offensive 
or sexual language in relation to a school issue would give schools 
virtually limitless authority to regulate student expression, even 
within the sanctity of the home.158  Because of this, the Court should 
expressly articulate that Fraser is inapplicable to student speech over 
the Internet.159 
An important element in Fraser is that the student speaker had a 
captive audience, as he gave the speech during a mandatory school 
assembly during school hours.160  The sexually explicit nature of the 
speech in Fraser was another crucial factor, as the Court noted that 
“[t]he pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly 
offensive to both teachers and students[.]”161  The grammatical 
structure of this statement suggests that the sexual innuendo was the 
specific reason that the Court categorized the speech as offensive.162 
Under the Tinker standard, the Third Circuit correctly decided 
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District because the school districts 
could not show there was a substantial disturbance in either case.  If 
the Third Circuit applied the Fraser standard, it is likely that the two 
students’ suspensions could have been upheld because the profiles in 
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District both contained foul and 
sexually explicit language.  This contrary holding could amount to a 
near abolition of student free speech rights because it would give 
officials expansive authority to regulate speech any time it contains 
offensive language and is directed at the school.  Ultimately, this 
could lead to censorship in cases where the speaker is making a 
political point if the speaker chooses to express himself using 
sexualized or obscene language to emphasize his point.  The 
Supreme Court should clarify that Fraser does not apply to online 
student speech to prevent the slippery slope of school regulation of 
all offensive speech. 
 
significant discussion.  Nevertheless, the limitations emphasized by the Morse Court 
would warrant the conclusion that the Court did not intend for Morse to be stretched.  
If a Morse-type of case were raised, the Tinker standard should be applied.  
 157  Tomain, supra note 15, at 99. 
 158  Mattus, supra note 5, at 334.  
 159  See Tomain, supra note 15, at 104 (arguing that holding Fraser as inapplicable 
to online speech is “more than a mere logical application of Fraser”). 
 160  See Tomain, supra note 15, at 10304. 
 161  Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 162  Tomain, supra note 15, at 117 n.109. 
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C.  Limitations to Tinker’s Application in Online Speech 
The Supreme Court should further specify that the Tinker 
substantial disruption standard is controlling only in cases such as 
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District where the expression is not 
a threat of violence and the target of the speech is a school employee. 
The need to maintain a safe educational environment is a 
common argument in support of permitting schools to regulate 
students’ speech.  The flaw of such an argument is that it overlooks 
that “true threats” are already categorically unprotected under First 
Amendment jurisprudence in all settingsincluding schools as well 
as other public places.163  Furthermore, courts have generally shown 
greater deference to the determination that speech amounts to a true 
threat in the school setting, which independently grants schools 
greater authority to address threatening speech.164  School officials 
are responsible for the safety of students on school property, and this 
compelling interest warrants increased discretion for school officials 
to act in cases where there is a plausible threat of violence that rises, 
even in situations where the threatening speech is on the borderline 
of the true threat jurisprudence.165  There is a significant difference 
between name-calling or offensive remarks and speech that expresses 
a threat of violence; therefore, it follows that there should be a 
difference in the level of First Amendment protection that each is 
afforded.166 
The emotional distinction between students and educators gives 
schools a more compelling interest to regulate student speech in 
cases involving peer-on-peer cyberbullying than online comments 
about a teacher.  School-aged youth are “much more vulnerable to 
intimidation and mockery than teachers with advanced degrees and 
20 years of experience.”167  Adolescent students lack the emotional 
 
 163  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (defining true threat as statements 
that convey to a reasonable person a serious intent to cause violent harm or intent to 
make the victim fearful of bodily harm, even if the speaker does not intend to 
actually fulfill the threat). 
 164  Goldman, supra note 25, at 412. 
 165  See Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
the school had the authority to suspend a student for showing other students a 
detailed written description of a “dream” about shooting a teacher); Bystrom v. 
Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987) (upholding the punishment of 
students who created a publication that applauded the vandalism of a teacher’s 
home).  These cases are examples of situations where the courts afforded school 
officials the discretion to address acts of violence, even though the threat may not 
have risen to the level of severity of a true threat. 
 166  Dischell, supra note 125. 
 167  Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials 
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maturity to deal with derogatory speech in the same capacity as 
adults.168  Cyberbullying has emerged as an important problem in 
today’s schools, with one study concluding that thirty percent of 
middle-school students had been victimized by cyberbullying for at 
least two days in the past month.169  These policy concerns, among 
others, warrant the conclusion that schools should have greater 
authority to prevent and respond to the online harassment of fellow 
students.170 
When the online speech is aimed at an adult, a school’s 
discretion to punish the student should be limited, absent a showing 
of a true threat of violence or reasonable foreseeability of a 
substantial disturbance in the school.  Although studies suggest that 
teachers can be emotionally affected by student speech,171 this 
concern is outweighed by the risk of chilling student speech about 
potentially important school matters.  Teachers and administrators 
are in a better position to simply ignore the offensive online speech 
and view the speech as a necessary price to pay for the freedoms 
afforded by the Constitution.172  Furthermore, school officials and 
employees are not left without recourse against students who choose 
to post inflammatory and offensive comments on the Internet.173  
School officials can pursue legal action for relief through the 
courts,174 under causes of action such as defamation175 and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress,176 depending on the circumstances.177  
 
and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 641 (2011) (citing 
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 168  Jacob Tabor, Note, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-
Campus Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 600 (2009). 
 169  Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary: 
Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, Cyberbullying Res. Ctr., J. OF SCH. HEALTH (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_self_esteem 
_research_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 170  The legal standard governing school regulation of student-on-student online 
speech, although very important, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 171  Waldman, supra note 167, at 644. 
 172  See Adam Cohen, Why Students Have a Right to Mock Teachers Online, TIME, June 
20, 2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2078636,00 
.html. 
 173  Davis, supra note 25. 
 174  Id. 
 175  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-237 
(West) (2011). 
 176  See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  This is 
assuming, arguendo, that the student’s conduct rose to the requisite level of severity, 
which would likely not be legally sufficient in Layshock or J.S. 
 177  Whether any particular cause of action would be available to a victimized 
educator would require a fact intensive inquiry.  The underlying elements of the 
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Under the current framework, these alternative legal actions available 
to educators can also raise some concerns because the student could 
ultimately be punished twice for the same offensive conduct, which 
some scholars suggest amounts to judicial overkill.178  The school 
employee can also take non-legal actions, such as simply sitting down 
with the student and politely asking for the content to be removed or 
speaking with the student’s parent.179 
A different standard for student speech that targets educators, as 
opposed to fellow students, is furthered justified by the potential for 
conflict-of-interest problems when the educator involved in the 
punishment is also the focus of the disparaging speech.  In cases such 
as Layshock and Blue Mountain School District where the speech is 
directed at a key decision-maker in the school—the principal—that 
decision-maker’s objectivity may be compromised because of the 
personal impact on him or her.180  The decision-maker’s personal 
feelings could influence any punishment imposed;181 therefore, 
requiring teachers and administrators to show that the speech caused 
a substantial disruption would help curb the potential for abuse of 
discretion that could occur under a less protective standard of 
student speech.182 
 
causes of actions and the remedies each affords are beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
 178  Calvert, supra note 24, at 1178. 
 179  Although these solutions may, on their face, seem overly idealistic, they would 
likely be successful.  For example, in Layshock, after the principal confronted Justin 
about the profile, Justin apologized verbally and through a letter and took down the 
profile immediately.  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 
2011).  In one study, a researcher sent e-mails to adolescents with MySpace profiles 
that contained evidence of illegal or sexual behavior, suggesting that the individuals 
“modify their profiles or make them private.”  Although the researcher had no 
connection to the individuals contacted, some of the profiles were changed.  Perri 
Klass, Seeing Social Media More as Portal Than as Pitfall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/health/views/seeing-social-media 
-as-adolescent-portal-more-than-pitfall.html.  This suggests that, in cases where there 
is a relationship between the individuals, social pressure might lead to even higher 
voluntary compliance rates. 
 180  Goldman, supra note 25, at 422. 
 181  Id. 
 182  For example, the Fraser “offensive” standard would have great potential for 
abuse.  What is offensive to today’s school-aged generation can be very different from 
what is offensive to an adult.  If school districts were given the same deference by the 
courts to punish speech aimed at adults as students, it would not seem far-fetched to 
suggest that hurt feelings could bias an administrator’s determination of whether the 
speech is in fact offensive. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
“Tinker and its progeny are not well adapted to today’s 
technological world where the once-certain schoolhouse gate is 
virtually nonexistent.”183  Under current law, all student-speech cases 
are controlled by four Supreme Court decisions;184 however, all four 
cases were decided in the context of on-campus speech.  The 
Supreme Court has never addressed the applicability of this First 
Amendment framework to student speech that occurs on the 
Internet, and therefore circuit courts and district courts alike have 
experienced difficulty in establishing the parameters of student 
online free speech rights. 
Because of the unique characteristics of the Internet,185 the 
Court should formulate a new standard establishing cyberspace as a 
unique location instead of forcing lower courts to struggle in 
applying the traditional student-speech framework, which focuses on 
the on-campus/off-campus distinction, to the Internet.  The Court 
should set Tinker as the controlling standard for determining whether 
school officials have the authority to punish student speech.  
Furthermore, the Court should recognize the need to give school 
officials greater deference in situations where the speech poses a 
threat to school safety or when the speech targets a fellow classmate, 
as opposed to a school employee. 
 
 183  Mattus, supra note 5, at 335; see also supra Part IV. 
 184  See discussion of the four Supreme Court cases supra Part II. 
 185  See Johnson, supra note 137. 
